of our army') could not be compelled to take a step which even the French cabinet in a moment of sincerity had themselves stigmatised. On December 31, 1866, they wrote, 'It is not easy for Maximilian to make any retreat which will not be a stain on his political life; and all must wish that it could be otherwise. But will he have the energy necessary for opening a new campaign? 'Maximilian had at his own risk made use of the personal right he undoubtedly possessed, and had thrown himself back into the melée. But he forgot that his ambition was so far culpable that it kept on the civil war. When he entered on the career which M. Eloïn opened out before his eyes, he ought to have descried on the horizon a battle-field where he might have found the merited death which fortune has in reserve for conquerors disappointed in arms.
The marshal, however, could not help being repugnant to being the means of precipitating Maximilian's fall by entering into negotiations with the liberal chiefs, negotiations too which seemed inopportune, as the expeditionary corps was about to retire, leaving behind it a sovereign unwilling to abdicate. Thus, the military and political conduct of the French representatives must have appeared suspicious, and with good reason, since it was suggested by instructions from the Tuileries which were always vague and indefinite, opening the door to every kind of compromise. Outside head-quarters the intrigues with the rebels were still going on. As to the marshal, ever faithful to his duty and to his written orders, he informed the liberal chiefs that, although he was forbidden by his government to undertake any fresh expeditions against them, he was at any rate directed to fire upon them if they approached the places occupied by our arms, any
