complete disaster, and impartial history will loudly declare that General de Lorencez's retreat across thirty leagues of troubled country, inundated as it was, and affording every facility for ambuscade—intimidating by the bold bearing of his little column Carbajal's numerous cavalry which crowned the cerros, without daring to come down, and bringing back his wounded and stores safe to Orizaba, stands at the head of all noble feats of arms. Two mistakes were made by the military authorities, who had misunderstood the great principles of the war. In the first place, they were bound to see how matters stood before they placed themselves at the entrance of Puebla, into which they thought they could enter as into a friendly city; but it received them, when they were a short distance off, with a running fire; subsequently, it was a measure of necessity that they should make themselves sure, in a military point of view, of Borrego, which commanded the town of Orizaba, in which they had to seek a refuge after the retreat.
But the defeat at Puebla was principally caused by the complete ignorance which M. Saligny, who was armed with extensive powers, and marched with the army, showed as to all that concerned the place and its inhabitants. The general, deceived by the assertions of an ill-informed diplomacy, pushed straight on, convinced that the streets of Puebla were adorned with triumphal arches in honour of our soldier-liberators. The disappointment was a cruel one, and it ought to have been foreseen. Could the refugee party, who had for years been growing old as exiles from their country, be expected to give the necessary information? Besides, we had taken for our ally General Marquez, well known in Mexico for his cruelty, who, in obedience to the orders of President Miramon, and in opposition
