the way of their march by a resistance of the fortresses on the Meuse, or by destroying railways, roads, tunnels, or other similar works, Germany will, to her regret, be compelled to consider Belgium as an enemy.
"In this event, Germany can undertake no obligations towards Belgium, but the eventual adjustment of the relations between the two States must be left to the decision of arms.
"The German Government, however, entertain the distinct hope that this eventuality will not occur, and that the Belgian Government will know how to take the necessary measures to prevent the occurrence of incidents such as those mentioned. In this case the friendly ties which bind the two neighbouring States will grow stronger and more enduring."
I beg the reader to notice carefully the nature of the "evidence" against France set forth in the first paragraph. The Belgian Army is weaker than that of France, therefore France is going to invade Belgium. Since the time of the grave-digger in Hamlet there was never such logic as this. All Prussian "culture" is in the document: the coarse offer of ready cash, the clumsy lie, the empty promise, and the mailed fist.
King Albert called his Ministers together, and at seven o'clock the following morning great "little Belgium" handed this proud reply to the unmoral Goliath. [I omit the formal first paragraph.]—
