however, so rapid that the alternate appearance and disappearance of the two different impressions is completely unnoticed. Thus, for instance, while looking at the dome of St. Paul's, if our memory suddenly evokes the image of some other object, Mont Blanc for instance, the picture of the cathedral, although still depicted on our retina, is momentarily effaced by the effort of the will, although we may not change the position of our eyes during the time. While the memory continues to dwell on the picture it has called up, it is seen with sufficient distinctness, although its details may be somewhat misty and its colours confused; but as soon as the wish to see it passes away the whole disappears, and the cathedral is seen in all its former distinctness.
In darkness and solitude, when surrounding objects produce no images that can interfere with those of the mind, these latter are more lively and distinct: and when in addition we are half asleep and half awake, the intensity of mental impressions approaches that of visible objects. In the case of persons of studious habits who are continually employed in mental effort, these images are more distinct than with those who follow the ordinary avocations of life, and during their working hours rarely see the objects round them. The earnest thinker, absorbed by meditation, is in a manner deprived for the time of the use of his senses. His children and servants pass in and out of his study without his seeing them, they speak to him without his hearing them and they may even try to rouse him from his reverie without success; and yet his eyes, ears, and nerves received the impression of light, sound, and touch. In such instances, the mind of the philosopher is voluntarily occupied in following out an idea which interests him profoundly; but even the most unlearned and thoughtless of us sees the images of dead
