thousand had any book or mannscript to read, if he had learnt. It is plain that as the intelligence of the country has advanced, we have been receding from anything like a real representation, because it has become every year less possible for the rude forms of an earlier age to convey the varieties of expression that have in modern times been called into existence. It is no answer to say, that if we have not had representation, we have had something that has done as well,—if it has not been actual it has been "virtual." The question is, whether we are to proceed towards a system of representation, or towards something else—not representation, but a substitute for it. It is a question which every one should present to himself before he begins to reason on the subject of parliamentary reform, as the whole tenor of his argument will be necessarily governed by the answer.
The fundamental law of election, M. Guizot states to be "que les électeurs fassent ce qu'ils veulent, et sachent ce qu'ils font."[1] In the intelligent performance of the act of voting, the elector will necessarily have some preparatory knowledge, some inclination of mind, some train of thought, or some calculation of interest, disposing him to prefer one or more persons to others. The causes of the disposition are of course almost infinite. It would be useful, if it were possible, to consider them, and their operation upon every class of mind.
The conclusions which are founded upon personal knowledge—that is, by knowledge acquired by intimate personal acquaintance and contact, must be very rare—so rare, that with reference to the great body of the electors of the kingdom, they are scarcely deserving of consideration. Knowledge of this kind of course exists somewhere as to every man, but can extend only to a small circle. In that extent this knowledge as to new candidates will of course be of great value. In a former page, the effect of giving a separate
- ↑ Guizot, Gouv. Rep., vol. ii., p. 247.
