similar expressions, as if it implied that it was a palladium of liberty; the fact being that the term only refers to the popular election as the ultimate authority, by describing one of its prominent features, as we, on such occasions, say "appeal to the hustings." No greater idea of specific virtue is attached to the machine called the "ballot-box" than we do to the wooden platform called "the hustings." The secrecy which the advocates of the former amongst us chiefly desire, is for the most part, and in all countries really free, regarded as of the smallest importance.
The difference and contrasts between the system here proposed, which may be called the system of individual independence,—and that of the ballot, are these:
The ballot proposes to give to every voter a perfect freedom to vote for any of the two or three candidates who may think proper to present themselves. The system of individual independence offers him a freedom of choice, not only of the two or three, but probably of two or three thousand candidates.
It may possibly be said, that one is freedom of choice, the other the extent of choice, which the ballot does not pretend to enlarge, and that therefore it is no defect in that system that it fails to do so. This may logically be an answer. It is, nevertheless, a proper subject of comparison between the two systems.
The ballot proposes to extinguish bribery and put an end to intimidation, by depriving every person disposed to bribe or intimidate of the means of knowing how the elector has voted. The system of individual responsibility proposes to put an end to bribery and intimidation by taking away all the artificial and pecuniary value of the vote.
The ballot cannot extinguish bribery. It is almost inevitable that in a country like England, so rich in rewards for political services, a system which places bribery out of the reach of detection, and gives it impunity, will extend the
