upon it. The voting paper in every constituency would be different, and no uniform ticket could he safely used. Every candidate will require his name to be placed first, or first after some one certain of being elected,—or it will probably be of no use to him. The intercalation of any candidate who fails would prevent the vote from being used for any lower name, and may deprive it of any influence on the election. Parties may, indeed, adopt the use of printed voting papers, leaving blanks at the head, or near it, for the local candidates, and inserting below the names of other principal candidates of their side. The extent of the use of these papers, or “tickets” would measure the popular sympathy with the party whose opinions it express, and would give them the moral weight of such adherence. It is a mode of gathering a knowledge of popular opinion and sentiment which is every way desirable; and it would have no other than a salutary effect on the particular election.
In an ealier stage of the method it was proposed to reduce the number of candidates, and arrive at an equal quota for those who were elected, by giving a proportionate value to every contingent vote, and computing the total of such values as the measure of support each candidate had received. This was open to the objection that it gave inordinate weight to numbers acting by means of party papers or tickets, and the suggestion was for that reason withdrawn.[1] The plan proposed for the city of Frankfort[2] is liable to the same objection.
The principle always kept in view has been that in forming the representative assembly of the nation, full play should be given to the expression of all opinions and sentiments, that they may be admitted to the test and scrutiny of discussion. The electors are the dispersed inhabitants of an extensive and
- ↑ Pages 187, 188. See also Appendix C. This is the difficulty alluded to by Mr. Mill in his Considerations on Representative Government, p. 158, 2nd ed. It has been obviated by excluding a contingent vote from any effect on the election, until it is taken to make up a quota or comparative majority.
- ↑ Appendix B., p. 299.
