continue to eat bread notwithstanding the hard work by which it is produced, this is because he cannot forego what is indispensable while waiting for the present conditions of labour to be altered. But with regard to things which are not only unnecessary but are even superfluous, there can be no other conclusion than this: that if I pity men engaged in the manufacture of certain articles, then I must on no account accustom myself to require such articles.
But nowadays men argue otherwise. They invent the most various and intricate arguments, but never say what naturally occurs to every plain man. According to them, it is not at all necessary to abstain from luxuries. One can sympathize with the condition of the working men, deliver speeches and write books on their behalf, and at the same time continue to profit by the labour that one sees to be ruinous to them.
According to one argument, I may profit by labour that is harmful to the workers, because if I do not another will. Which is something like the argument that I must drink wine that is injurious to me, because it has been bought, and if I do not drink it others will do so.
According to another argument, it is even beneficial to the workers to be allowed to produce luxuries, as in this way we provide them with money—i.e., with the means of subsistence: as if we could not provide them with the means of subsistence in any other way than by making them produce articles injurious to them and superfluous to us.
But according to a third argument, now most popular, it seems that, since there is such a thing as division of labour, any work upon which a man is engaged—whether he be a Government official, priest, landowner, manufacturer, or merchant—is so useful that it fully compensates for the labour of the working classes by which he profits. One serves the State, another the Church, a third science, a fourth art, and a fifth serves those who serve the State, science, and art; and all are
