propagating the new religion as a means to revolution was planned by these two men, and that Hung was not admitted to the secret until after the crises of 1848.
That the far-sighted Chu was relying on military prowess for the eventual success of the enterprise is too plainly stated to need any argument. He could not raise such a following as he needed, however, without some kind of religious mask, for the authorities were suspicious; therefore these societies of God-worshippers were exactly what he required. His task was apparently to drill them into skilled soldiers. We can understand how these leaders acquired military skill. Who can fail to see the mind of Chu rather than of Hung behind all this?
The confession of T'ienteh plainly tells us that he disagreed with Hung on his policies at Yungan and merely awaited a favorable opportunity to displace him. Such an opportunity might come sooner or it might be greatly deferred. But the evidence, as a whole, presents us with a picture of two antagonistic ideas lying behind this sudden outburst: one with anti-dynastic aims and political motives, a true nationalistic movement headed by T'ienteh; the other emphasising an iconoclastic, fanatical religion resting on supposed revelation and woven together from Confucian and Christian teachings into the peculiar faith of which the T'ienwang was the chief exponent. Early in the movement the two roads ran parallel. Eventually they were destined to diverge and lead in opposite directions, for T'ienteh must have foreseen and intended ultimately to avoid the national opposition which such a religion would arouse. When that day should come the struggle would naturally be aimed first at securing the allegiance of these God-worshippers, the pawns without which neither side could win.
While we cannot trace the course of the dissensions among the leaders during 1848, we may surmise that
