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"he had provided the false information in an attempt to reduce the pressure on himself ... and to give an account that was consistent with what [Hambali] assessed the questioners wanted to hear."[1]
(TS// //NF) CIA officers later suggested that the misleading answers and resistance to interrogation that CIA interrogators cited in their requests to use the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques against Hambali and an associated CIA detainee, Lillie, may not have been resistance to interrogation, but rather the result of issues related to culture and their poor English language skills.[2]
- 6. After the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, CIA Headquarters Questions Detention of Detainee and Recommends Release; Detainee Transferred to U.S. Military Custody and Heldfor An Additional Four Years
(TS// //NF) In October 2003, the CIA interrogated Arsala Khan, an Afghan national in his mid-fifties who was believed to have assisted Usama bin Laden in his escape
through the Tora Bora Mountains in late 2001.[3] After 56 hours of standing sleep deprivation, Arsala Khan was described as barely able to enunciate, and being "visibly shaken by his hallucinations depicting dogs mauling and killing his sons and family." According to CIA cables, Arsala Khan "stated that [the interrogator] was responsible for killing them and feeding them to the dogs."[4]
(TS// //NF) Arsala Khan was subsequently allowed to sleep.[5] Two days later, however, the interrogators returned him to standing sleep deprivation. After subjecting Khan to 21 additional hours of sleep deprivation, interrogators stopped using the CIA's enhanced
weeks of daily debriefing sessions with [the case officer] carried out almost entirely in Bahasa Indonesia. [Hambali] has consistently warmed to [the case officer's] discussions with him, and has provided to [the case officer] additional information that he had avoided in the past... More tellingly, [Hambali] has opened up considerably to [the case officer] about his fears and motivations, and has taken to trusting [the case officer] at his word. [Hambali] looks to [the case officer] as his sole confidant and the one person who has [Hambali]'s interest in mind...." See 1142 (301055Z NOV 03). This cable appears to have been retransmitted the following day as 1144 (010823Z DEC 03).
- ↑ 1142 (301055Z NOV 03)
- ↑ 1072 (110606Z OCT 03) 1075 (111828Z OCT 03) 1142 (301055Z NOV 03); 1158 (081459Z DEC 03); 1604 (191232Z JAN 04). After an Indonesian speaker was deployed to debrief Hambali, the debriefer "got the distinct impression [Hambali] was just responding 'yes' in the typical Indonesian cultural manner when they [sic] do not comprehend a question." The CIA cable then noted that, "[j]ust to clarify, [the Indonesian speaking debriefer] then posed the same question in Indonesian," and "[w]ithout pause, [Hambali] replied with a direct contradiction, claiming that on 20 September 2001, he was in Karachi, not Qandahar." (See 1075 (111828Z OCT 03).) A January 2004 cable stated that "Lillie is of limited value," adding that "[h]is English is very poor, and we do not have a Malay linguist." See 1604 (191232Z JAN 04). See also detainee reviews in Volume III for additional information.
- ↑ WASHINGTON
- ↑ 1393 (201006Z OCT 03). The information was also released in 48122 . CIA records indicate that the CIA's interrogations of Arsala Khan resulted in one disseminated intelligence report, derived from information Khan provided the day he experienced the hallucinations. See , via CIA WASHINGTON DC .
- ↑ 1393 (201006Z OCT 03)
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