Page:US Senate Report on CIA Detention Interrogation Program.pdf/61

This page needs to be proofread.

UNCLASSIFIED

(TS// //NF) To address these issues, the cable stated that if Abu Zubaydah were to die during the interrogation, he would be cremated.[1] The interrogation team closed the cable by stating:

"regardless which [disposition] option we follow however, and especially in light of the planned psychological pressure techniques to be implemented, we need to get reasonable assurances that [Abu Zubaydah] will remain in isolation and incommunicado for the remainder of his life."[2]

(TS// //NF) Officers from the CIA's ALEC Station responded to the interrogation team's comments several days later. Their cable noted that the interrogation team was correct in its "understanding that the interrogation process takes precedence over preventative medical procedures."[3] ALEC Station further observed:

"There is a fairly unanimous sentiment within HQS that [Abu Zubaydah] will never be placed in a situation where he has any significant contact with others and/or has the opportunity to be released. While it is difficult to discuss specifics at this point, all major players are in concurrence that [Abu Zubaydah] should remain incommunicado for the remainder of his life. This may preclude [Abu Zubaydah] from being turned over to another country, but a final decision regarding his future incarceration condition has yet to be made."[4]

(TS// //NF) As a result of the request by National Security Advisor Rice for additional research on the CIA's proposed interrogation techniques, CIA and DOJ personnel contacted individuals at the Department of Defense's Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA), the agency that administers the SERE school, to gather information about the effects of using the techniques in training exercises.[5] According to CIA officer  , who had   joined the CIA's OTS after   years at JPRA, an individual with SERE school experience commented that "information gleaned via harsh treatment may not be accurate, as the prisoner may say anything to avoid further pain," and that "[c]urrent doctrine for interrogations conducted in the permanent phase of capture may lean towards 'soft' or 'indirect' rounds of questioning."[6]

(TS// //NF) Pursuant to National Security Advisor Rice's request, CIA Headquarters personnel also requested information from the interrogation team—particularly


  1.   10536 (151006Z JUL 02)
  2.   10536 (151006Z JUL 02)
  3. ALEC   (182321Z JUL 02)
  4. ALEC   (182321Z JUL 02)
  5. Email from  ; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Request for JPRA information; date: July 19, 2002; July 24, 2002, fax from   to John Yoo and [REDACTED] providing information from the OTS/OAD psychologists; email from:  ; to:  , [REDACTED], [REDACTED],  ; subject: Discussion with JPRA Chief of Staff; date: July 24, 2002.
  6. Email from:  ; to: [REDACTED]; subject: Request for JPRA information; date: July 19, 2002. Records indicate that  's notes were not provided to the Department of Justice. In November 2002,   along with Chief of Interrogations  , led the first CIA interrogator training course.

Page 35 of 499
UNCLASSIFIED