Page:US Senate Report on CIA Detention Interrogation Program.pdf/73

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did Abu Zubaydah provide information about operatives in, or future attacks against, the United States.[1]

10. A CIA Presidential Daily Brief Provides Inaccurate Information on the Interrogation of Abu Zubaydah

(TS// //NF) Although CIA personnel at DETENTION SITE GREEN agreed that Abu Zubaydah was compliant and cooperative, personnel at CIA Headquarters prepared a Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) in October 2002 that, according to a cable, "accurately reflect[ed] the collective HQS view of the information provided [by Abu Zubaydah] to date."[2] The October 2002 PDB stated Abu Zubaydah was still withholding "significant threat information," including information on operatives in the United States, and that Abu "Zubaydah resisted providing useful information until becoming more cooperative in early August, probably in the hope of improving his living conditions."[3] The PDB made no reference to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques or the counter-assessment from the detention site interrogation team indicating that Abu Zubaydah was cooperative and not withholding information.[4]

(TS// //NF) CIA documents identified the "key intelligence" acquired from Abu Zubaydah as information related to suspected terrorists Jose Padilla and Binyam Mohammad, information on English-speaking al-Qa'ida member Jaffar al-Tayyar, and information identifying KSM as the mastermind of the September 11, 2001, attacks who used the alias "Mukhtar."[5] All of this information was acquired by FBI special agents shortly after Abu Zubaydah's capture.[6]

(TS// //NF) The CIA has consistently represented that Abu Zubaydah stated that the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques were necessary to gain his cooperation. For example, the CIA informed the OLC that:

"As Zubaydah himself explained with respect to enhanced techniques,

'brothers who are captured and interrogated are permitted by Allah to provide


  1. See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for additional details.
  2. ALEC   (181439Z OCT 02)
  3. ALEC   (181439Z OCT 02)
  4. Among other documents, see   10667 (231206Z AUG 02);   10672 (240229Z AUG 02); and email from: [REDACTED] (  chief of Base at DETENTION SITE GREEN); to: CIA Headquarters; subject: "Assessment to Date" of Abu Zubaydah; date: October 6, 2002, at 05:36:46 AM.
  5. See "Key Intelligence and Reporting Derived from Abu Zubaydah and KSM," dated February 2008, updated for briefings on several dates, including for a 2009 briefing to Director Leon Panetta, as well as the "Effectiveness Memo" provided to the Department of Justice, testimony provided by CIA Director Michael Hayden, and other documents discussed in detail in Volume 11. For example, see ODNI September 2006 press release stating: "During initial interrogation, Abu Zubaydah gave some information that he probably viewed as nominal. Some was important, however, including that Khalid Shaykh Mohammad (KSM) was the 9/11 mastermind and used the moniker 'Mukhtar.' This identification allowed us to comb previously collected intelligence for both names, opening up new leads to this terrorist plotter—leads that eventually resulted in his capture. It was clear to his interrogators that Abu Zubaydah possessed a great deal of information about al-Qa'ida; however, he soon stopped all cooperation. Over the ensuing months, the CIA designed a new interrogation program that would be safe, effective, and legal."
  6. See Abu Zubaydah detainee review in Volume III for additional details.

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