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(TS// //NF) Later investigations of DETENTION SITE COBALT conducted by the CIA inspector general and the deputy director of operations following the death of Gul Rahman found that the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques—and other coercive interrogation techniques—was more widespread than was reported in contemporaneous CIA cables. Specifically, the interrogation techniques that went unreported in CIA cables included standing sleep deprivation in which a detainee's arms were shackled above his head, nudity, dietary manipulation, exposure to cold temperatures, cold showers, "rough takedowns," and, in at least two instances, the use of mock executions.[1]
(TS// //NF) On November 18, 2002, staff from the CIA's Office of Inspector General contacted CTC Legal, , to indicate their interest in being briefed by CTC on the detention facility in Country . At their meeting with the DDO and the chief of CTC on November , 2002, the OIG staff explained that, while in that country on a separate matter, the staff had overheard a conversation that included references to "war crimes" and "torture" at a CIA detention facility and were therefore seeking to follow-up on this information. According to notes from the meeting, the DDO described the "most recent event concerning Gul Rahman"—his death, which occurred on November , 2002.[2]
- ↑ Special Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001 - October 2003) (2003-7123-IG), May 7, 2004; Memorandum for Deputy Director of Operations, from , January 28, 2003, Subject: Death Investigation – Gul RAHMAN; CIA Inspector General, Report of Investigation, Death of a Detainee (2003-7402-IG), April 27, 2005. Inspector General records of the interview of a senior CIA debriefer indicated that, "[d]uring the two weeks of interrogation training, she heard stories of [COBALT] detainees being 'hung for days on end,' not being fed, mock assassinations, and at least one case of a detainee being repeatedly choked." The senior debriefer also informed the Office of Inspector General that, "[s]he heard that while at [COBALT] [ , aka "CIA OFFICER 2"] had hung detainees up for long periods with their toes barely touching the ground." (See interview report, 2003-7123-IG, Review of Interrogations for Counterterrorism Purposes, , April 5, 2003.) DUNBAR described a "rough takedown" following the death of Gul Rahman at COBALT. "According to [DUNBAR], there were approximately five CIA officers from the renditions team. Each one had a role during the takedown and it was thoroughly planned and rehearsed. They opened the door of Rahman's cell and rushed in screaming and yelling for him to 'get down.' They dragged him outside, cut off his clothes and secured him with Mylar tape. They covered his head with a hood and ran him up and down a long corridor adjacent to his cell. They slapped him and punched him several times. [DUNBAR] stated that although it was obvious they were not trying to hit him as hard as they could, a couple of times the punches were forceful. As they ran him along the corridor, a couple of times he fell and they dragged him through the dirt (the floor outside of the cells is dirt). Rahman did acquire a number of abrasions on his face, legs, and hands, but nothing that required medical attention. (This may account for the abrasions found on Rahman's body after his death. Rahman had a number of surface abrasions on his shoulders, pelvis, arms, legs, and face.) At this point, Rahman was returned to his cell and secured. [DUNBAR] stated that [ [CIA OFFICER 1]] [the CIA officer in charge of DETENTION SITE COBALT] may have spoken to Rahman for a few moments, but he did not know what [ [CIA OFFICER 1]] said. [DUNBAR] stated that after something like this is done, interrogators should speak to the prisoner to 'give them something to think about.'" (See Memorandum for Deputy Director of Operations, from , January 28, 2003, Subject: Death Investigation – Gul RAHMAN, pp. 21-22.)
- ↑ See Notes of November , 2002, meeting D/IG [REDACTED].
experienced officer involved. The most junior in the chain of command should not have to bear the full weight of accountability when larger, systemic problems exist and when they are thrust into difficult battlefield situations by their supervisors and given a risky and difficult task and little preparation or guidance. Still, it is hard to accept that a CIA officer does not bear at least some responsibility for his or her actions, even under trying circumstances."
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