UNCLASSIFIED
"[a]ny data collected by them from detainees with whom they previously interacted as interrogators will always be suspect."[1] OMS then informed the management of the Renditions Group that "no professional in the field would credit [SWIGERT and DUNBAR's] later judgments as psychologists assessing the subjects of their enhanced measures."[2] At the end of their deployment, in June 2003, SWIGERT and DUNBAR provided their assessment of KSM and recommended that he should be evaluated on a monthly basis by "an experienced interrogator known to him" who would assess how forthcoming he is and "remind him that there are differing consequences for cooperating or not cooperating."[3] In his response to the draft Inspector General Special Review, OMS noted that "OMS concerns about conflict of interest… were nowhere more graphic than in the setting in which the same individuals applied an EIT which only they were approved to employ, judged both its effectiveness and detainee resilience, and implicitly proposed continued use of the technique – at a daily compensation reported to be $1800/day, or four times that of interrogators who could not use the technique."[4]
- D. The Detention and Interrogation of 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri
- 1. CIA Interrogators Disagree with CIA Headquarters About Al-Nashiri's Level of Cooperation; Interrogators Oppose Continued Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques
(TS// //NF) 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri,[5] assessed by the CIA to be an al-Qa'ida "terrorist operations planner" who was "intimately involved" in planning both the USS Cole bombing and the 1998 East Africa U.S. Embassy bombings, was captured in the United Arab Emirates in mid-October 2002.[6] He provided information while in the custody of a foreign government, including on plotting in the Persian Gulf,[7] and was then rendered by the
- ↑ The email, which expressed concern that SWIGERT and DUNBAR would interfere with on-site psychologists, stated that, "[a]lthough these guys believe that their way is the only way, there should be an effort to define roles and responsibilities before their arrogance and narcissism evolve into unproductive conflict in the field." See email from: ; to: , ; subject: RDG Tasking for IC Psychologists DUNBAR and SWIGERT; date: June 16, 2003, at 4:54:32 PM.
- ↑ Email from: ; to: ; cc: , , , , ; subject: Re: RDG Tasking for IC Psychologists DUNBAR and SWIGERT; date: June 20, 2003, at 2:19:53 PM.
- ↑ 12168 (301822Z JUN 03). The CIA's June 2013 Response states: "In practice, by April 2003, [CIA] staff psychologists had taken over almost all of the provisions of support to the RDI program. As it concerned [SWIGERT] and [DUNBAR], however, the appearance of impropriety continued, albeit to a lesser degree, because they were occasionally asked to provide input to assessments on detainees whom they had not interrogated" (emphasis added). The CIA's June 2013 Response is inaccurate. For example, in June 2003, SWIGERT and DUNBAR provided an assessment on KSM, a detainee whom they had interrogated.
- ↑ Memorandum for Inspector General, Attention: Assistant IG for Investigations, [REDACTED], from [REDACTED], M.D., Medical Services re Draft Special Review-Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program (2003-7123-IG), at 13.
- ↑ For more information on al-Nashiri, see detainee review of 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri in Volume III.
- ↑ ALEC ; 11357 (021242Z DEC 02); 36710
- ↑ See 36595 ; 36726 ; ALEC . For disseminated intelligence, see CIA ; CIA ; CIA ; CIA . For other reporting from al-Nashiri while he was in foreign government custody, see
Page 66 of 499
UNCLASSIFIED
