FM 3-18 operational indicators with strategic assumptions is also important. The chance of surpnse might bo wduccd if sstimatus weigh tactical indicators more heavily than strategic zissuniptions. Dismissing tactical indicators because they coniiict with preconcoptions may allow a hostilo deception Operation that PHYS tm thosé Drowmeptioiis to succeed, 2453. Offensive oountordeccption includes actions taken to iiwrce adversaries to reveal their actual and deception intentions and ulwjcctivcs, lt focuses on forcing an adversary to expend resources and continue deception operations that have been detected by reinforcing the perception that friendly ibices are unaware of Lhern. Counterdcception includes actions taken to thwart adver~ sary attempts to capitalize on deception tactics, thus affecting adversary demisionmaking processes. Staff Coordination 2~84. The G-2 and G-7 determine indicators of adversary deception activities. The G-2 incorporates in£>rmntio¤ requirements that identify these indicators into the collection plan. The G»2 is responsible for detocting adversary deception opumvicns. The G-7 coordinates the ouunwrdecoption ivsponso. Coordinating and special stnffofficors act within their fields of interest to negate, neutral- ize, and diminish adversary deception activities. The G-7 synchmnizes these actions. COUNTERPROPAGANDA 2455. Cuunnerpwpugzwda consists of programs of products and actions de- signed to nullify propaganda or mitigate its oifucts (FM £i—05.IlU). lt is diroctcd toward the target of advorsaiy propaganda, Coimterpropztganda degrades the harmful inhuoncs of adversary PSYOP on friendly forces and other audiences (see Jl" 353: FM 3435.30; FM 334-1). 286, Thu increasingly complex nature of military operations cunironts Army forces with new challenges. Nowhere is this challenge greater than in ooun» terpmpaganda, Counterpropaganda includes countering adversary misinfor- mation, disinfbrmation, and opposing information. PSYOP fumes attached to divisions and corps are responsible for counterpropaganda. Counterpropa- ganda applies across the range of operations and spectrum of oonflict. lt counters messages, images, rumors, and other information that aim to impede or prevent friendly mission accomplishment. Examples of adversary propaganda include the World Wm- ll radio broadcasts of Lord How Haw (William Joyce! to the British Isles during the Battle of Britain, and the radio broadcasts by Tokyo Rose in the Pacific 'Ylieuteri 2—87. Propaganda is any form of communication in support of national objec- tives designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behaidor of any group in order to beneiit the sponsor, eitlier directly or indirectly (JP 353). lt is normally directed at the United States, multinational pnrt· nets, and key audiences in the A0. Propaganda campaigns are deliberately designed to attack the will of nations to resist and soldiers to iight. Propa» gnndists seek to mix truth and lies in a way that listeners cannot detect. 238. Misinformarion is incorrect information from any source that is released for unknown reasons, or to solicit xx response or interest 2-1H
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