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the end-results were unadorned images of Toyota’s vehicles, the appearances of which do not owe their origins to Meshwerks, we are unable to reward that skill, effort, and labor with copyright protection.

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Meshwerks' intent in making its wire-frame models provides additional support for our conclusion. "In theory, the originality requirement tests the putative author’s state of mind: Did he have an earlier work in mind when he created his own?" Paul Goldstein, Goldstein on Copyright § 2.2.1.1. If an artist affirmatively sets out to be unoriginal – to make a copy of someone else's creation, rather than to create an original work – it is far more likely that the resultant product will, in fact, be unoriginal. See Russ VerSteeg, Intent, Originality, Creativity and Joint Authorship, 68 Brook. L. Rev. 123, 133 (2002) ("[A] person's intent to copy . . . should be considered strong evidence that what that person has produced is not copyrightable."). Of course, this is not to say that the accidental or spontaneous artist will be denied copyright protection for not intending to produce art; it is only to say that authorial intent sometimes can shed light on the question of whether a particular work qualifies as an independent creation or only a copy.

In this case, the undisputed evidence before us leaves no question that Meshwerks set out to copy Toyota’s vehicles, rather than to create, or even to add, any original expression. The purchase order signed by G&W asked

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