and dependant upon it. And, it is obfervable, that in this very cafe, as it is reported in 2 Sound. 259. the court fay that the validity of the fentence in the Admiralty court in Scotland was determinable by the law of Admiralty of England, and not by the common law. If, however, the diftinction made by the Plaintiff'‘s counfel was even admitted to be well founded, do the facts on which thefe actions muft be fupported, appear to be fubfequent to the final acquittal? It is true, there was a demand and refufal fubfequent to that decree, but a demand and refufal is only evidence of a converfion, and not the converfion itfelf. Are we to fhut our eyes againft the other evidence, and not fee when the converfion was made? It appears to have originated on the taking the veffel as prize on the high feas, and it was compleated on the fale and diftribution of the money in purfuance of the decree of the Superior Court of New-Hampʃhire, in confequence of the taking as prize:–All this long before the reverfal of the decree.
What is this, then, but an action to enforce by our authority, the decree of the Court of Appeals? Are we authorized to enforced that decree ? Is there any cafe whatever which fhews that an action will lie at common law, to carry into execution the decree of a prize court of Admiralty? The jurifdictions of the two courts are intirely feparate, and they judge by different laws. It is true, that in fome cafes the courts of common law and the Inʃtance Court of Admiralty, have concurrent jurifdictions, as in fuits for feamen's wages ; but in no cafes whatever have the Prize Courts of Admiralty and the common law courts a concurrent jurifdiction.
I have faid before that the queftion of prize would ftill occur in this action ; the ultimate fact difputed, is, whether the veffel and cargo were prize or not : the evidence to fupport or contradict this fact arifes, on the fide, from the fentences of the martime courts of New-Hampʃhire; on the other from the fentence of the court of appeals of Congrefs. The validity of the latter fentence is difputed ; if we fay it is valid, we in effect fay fhe is no prize, if otherwife, we fay fhe was a prize. We have clearly not authority to fay either one or the other. By the cafe in Saunders, we cannot determine upon the validity of the fentence itfelf ; and if we could, yet it is, as juftice Butler obferves in Douglas, evidence of a thing which a common law court has no right to enquire into.
Upon the whole, therefore, as the queftion to be tried in this action, if not directly a queftion of prize, is yet a queftion arifing upon the immediate and neceffary confequences of the veffel's being taken as prize, which is foley and exclufively of Admiralty jurifdiction; and as it is an action to carry into execution the fentences of the court of appeals, which we have no authority to do (that being the proper judicature to carry into effect its own fentences) we think the prefent Action will not lie, and adjudge that the attachments be diffolved.
