1788.
if the laws of any particular country could be extended beyond the jurifdiction of that country, which has likewife been denied ; and, it is faid, that in order to give a binding force to laws, it is neceffary that the perfon to be affected fhould have confented to them either by himfelf, or his reprefentatives.
But, having confidered the principles of the law of nations, and the reciprocal obligation of the ftates under the articles of confederation , we are of opinion, that the act of affembly by which the Defendant has been difcharged, muft be confidered as a general bankrupt law, made for general purpofes, and equally advantageous to all his creditors. To execute, therefore, upon his perfon out of the ftate in which he has been difcharged, would be giving a fuperiority to fome creditors, and affording them a double fatisfaction–to wit, a proportionable dividend of his property there, and the imprifonment of his perfon here.–It is true, that the laws of a particular country, have in themʃelve no extra-territorial force, no coercive operation ; but by the confent of nations, they acquire an influence and obligation, and, in many inftances, become conclufive throughout the world. Acts of pardon, marriage, and divorce, made in one country, are received and binding in all countries. In the ftate of Delaware there is a law, a narrow and contracted one indeed, which obliges executors or adminiftrators to difcharge the debts due from the deceafed to his creditors within theʃtate, in preference to every other. This the executors is obliged to comply with, becaufe he is immediately under the coercion of the law which prefcribes it ; fo that the diftribution thus made, is certainly binding out of the ftate, and the law is in that refpect every where received ; for, it would be more unjuft to compel the executor who acted legally in his own ftate, to pay the money out of his pocket, than that the creditor fhould loofe the amount of his demand.
With refpect to the argument, that no perfon can be bound by laws to which he has not either directly or virtually confented, it muft be obferved that, though Mr. Millar, the plaintiff, was not a citizen of Maryland yet Mr. Hall was ; and he by the law in queftion has been obliged to transfer all his effects for the benefit of all his creditors. Having done this, we muft prefume that he has fairly done it, and therefore to permit the taking his perfon here, would be to attempt to compel him to perform an impoffibility, that is, to pay a debt after he has been deprived of every means of payment,– an attempt which would, at leaft, amount to perpetual imprifonment, unlefs the benevolence of his friends fhould interfere to difcharge the Plaintiff's account.
From the nature of the act then, it appears to be founded upon equitable grounds, for general and juft purpofes ; it ought therefore to be regarded in all other countries, and fhould enjoy that weight, in our decifions, which it naturally derives from general conveniency, expediency, juftice, and humanity. For, mutual conveniency, policy, the confent of nations, and the general principles of juftice,
