1788.
a lien is obtained upon the lands of the Plaintiff in error, throughout the State.
Wilcocks, for the Defendant in error, admitted. I. That it had been long a queftion, whether the Supreme Court had original jurifdiction before the paffing of the late law ; but, even refolving that point in the negative, he contended, that the Court might receive and fuftain a caufe under the peculiar circumftances of the prefent cafe. For, being an action of debt, it was, in its nature cognizable there, and no law prevented the parties from confeffing Judgment, by confent, without the trouble and expence of an original. This was not, therefore, to be conftrued into an exercife of original jurifdiction ; but merely a paffive acquiefcence in the agreement of the parties, to enter a Judgment upon the records of the Court. Such, he faid, had been the old and conftant practice in Pennʃylvania, both before and fince the revolution, as well with refpect to the confeffion of Judgments, as to be entering of amicable actions ; and if the matter were to be traced, the titles of many real eftates would be found to depend upon its legality–fo that the greateft diforder and uncertainty would be introduced by a contrary determination at this time. If, then, it was never doubted that the Court had a fuffiicient authority to compel the parties to perform at agreement, a ƒortiori, they may compel the performance, when the agreement is made with the folemnities of a warrant of attorney, and under circumftances which otherwife be attended with the moft pernicious confequences.
II. With refpect to the ʃecond Error, he faid, that, if it were neceffary, the Court would permit him to alter his plea ; but as it had been agreed to difcufs the validity of the warrant of Attorney on the prefent iffue, he fhould contend, that the cafes cited did not fupport the objection. He admitted, that when an act of Parliament entered into an exact enumeration, and it appeared from the fubject, that nothing more was intended, than what was expreffed, there the rule prevailed, and a recapitulation of inƒerior things, could not, by implication, affect things of a ʃuperior nature. But when an act contains general and comprehenfive words, which indicate an intention to embrace a higher object, he infifted, that one fpirit and meaning of the law, was not to be fettered by the mode of expreffion. This controverfy, however, he diftinguifhed from the cafe of ftatutes ; for, he faid, it did not arife on the conftruction of an act of Parliament, but whether an inftrument, executed by an individual, was fufficient to authorize certain proceedings. It was, therefore, a matter of a private nature, and muft be conftrued, as all contracts between Debtor and Creditor are conftrued, that is, according to the true intent and meaning of the parties. The form of the warrant is the fame that has been ufed for more that a century paft ; it is general; it is comprehenfive ; and it has ever been taken in that fenfe, which gives the greateft benefit to obligee, that can be obtained from the confeffion of the Judgment. The late act of Affembly (paffed September 1786,) which gives original Jurifdiction
