(and our law is fubject to the fame conftruction) a perfon who refides in a foreign country, trades to that kingdom, and afterwards goes thither, is clearly within the ftatute. It is true, that, confidering the mere phrafe, it feems abfurd to fay, that a man keeps his houfe, who has, in fact, no houfe to keep, and yet there is a cafe exprefsly to that point, where a man, having no home of his own, was held to have committed an act of bankruptcy by keeping houfe in the dwelling of another.
But the Defendant counfel have controverted this objection upon the ground of a departure out of the State; which, they fay, applies as well to a ftranger as an inhabitant ; while, in behalf of the Plaintiff, it is contended, that, as the only proof of a departure by Goodwin and Smith, is that of going to their own houfe in New Jerʃey, this cannot, upon principle or precedent, be conftrued into an act of bankruptcy. From the evidence, it appears, that a writ had iffued againft the four Defendants, of which all of them had notice; two of them, it is agreed, committed acts of bankruptcy, and the other two, being enquired for at the ftore of Meng, and alfo at the Ferry-houʃe, where they had ordered a boat to be ready, for the exprefs purpofe of avoiding an arreft, did actually of them. This conduct, in the common cafes of a refident, would, undoubtedly, amount to an act of bankruptcy; for, it has often been determined, that, if a man goes from home but a day, in order to delay or defraud his creditor, it is fufficient to bring him within the ftatute. Whether, however, the flight of a ftranger to his own home in another State, is fuch a departure as the law intends, the cafes have left in great obfcurity ; for the only principle afcertained by them,is, that the departure muft be with a view to delay or defraud; and the act of Parliament itfelf contains no diftinction of the nature now contended for. On fo doubtful a point, therefore, the Court would rather, at this time, leave the decifion at large to the Jury, than venture a pofitive opinion.
Such then are the objections on which the Plaintiff infifts that his action is maintainable ; and, if, upon the whole, the Jury think he has been unƒairly obtained ; either becaufe the commiffion ought not to have iffued, or that the certificate ought not to have been granted, their verdict muft be in his favor. But, if, on the contrary, there has been no illegal or unfair methods purfued by the Defendants to obtain their certificate, they are difcharged from the Plaintiff's demand, and the verdict muft be for them.
After ftaying out fome time, the Jury returned to the bar, and declared they they could not agree in a verdict ; whereupon they were difmiffed by confent of the parties, and a Venire ƒacias de novo awarded. [♦]
[♦]I have been tranformed by Mr. Ingerʃol, one of the Plaintiff's counfel, that his client, acting on this occafion upon motives of public fpirit, was fatisfied with having obtained the opinion of the Court in favor of the right to inveftigate the proceedings before the Commiffioners of bankruppts, &c. upon trial at law; and that, therefore, probably, this action would never be profecuted further.
