Opinion of the Court
tion, the District Court sentenced Dominguez to the mandatory minimum. At the sentencing hearing, all counsel told the court that they had thought Dominguez might at least have been eligible for the safety valve mitigation, but agreed that with three convictions, he was not. Dominguez told the court that he had "never had any knowledge about the points of responsibility, the safety valve, or anything like that." App. 109. The court replied that in light of the "lengthy change of plea proceedings" it was "difficult . . . to accept what" Dominguez said. Id., at 112.
On appeal, Dominguez argued that the District Court's failure to warn him, as Rule 11(c)(3)(B) instructs, that he could not withdraw his guilty plea if the court did not accept the Government's recommendations required reversal. After waiting for United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55 (2002), a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed, 310 F.3d 1221 (2002), and cited United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993), in applying the plain error standard. The court held that the District Court had indeed erred; and that the error was plain, affected Dominguez's substantial rights, and required correction in the interests of justice.
To show that substantial rights were affected, the Court of Appeals required Dominguez to "prove that the court's error was not minor or technical and that he did not understand the rights at issue when he entered his guilty plea." 310 F.3d, at 1225.[1] The court rejected the Government's arguments that the written plea agreement or the District Court's other statements in the plea colloquy sufficiently advised Dominguez of his rights, given Dominguez's inability to speak English and the assurances of both counsel that he would likely qualify under the safety valve provision. Judge Tallman dissented, with the warning that the majori-
- ↑ Other Courts of Appeals employed different tests. See n. 8, infra.
