Page:United States Reports, Volume 542.djvu/390

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Cite as: 542 U.S. 348 (2004)

351

Opinion of the Court

Ring, we applied this principle to a death sentence imposed under the Arizona sentencing scheme at issue here. We concluded that, because Arizona law authorized the death penalty only if an aggravating factor was present, Apprendi required the existence of such a factor to be proved to a jury rather than to a judge. 536 U.S., at 603–609.^[1] We specifically overruled our earlier decision in Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), which had upheld an Arizona death sentence against a similar challenge. 536 U.S., at 609.

The Ninth Circuit, relying on Ring, invalidated respondent's death sentence. Summerlin v. Steward, 341 F.3d 1082, 1121 (2003) (en banc).^[2] It rejected the argument that Ring did not apply because respondent's conviction and sentence had become final on direct review before Ring was decided. We granted certiorari. 540 U.S. 1045 (2003).^[3]

II

When a decision of this Court results in a "new rule," that rule applies to all criminal cases still pending on direct review. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987). As to convictions that are already final, however, the rule applies only in limited circumstances. New substantive rules generally apply retroactively. This includes decisions that narrow the scope of a criminal statute by interpreting its terms,

↑ Because Arizona law already required aggravating factors to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, see State v. Jordan, 126 Ariz. 283, 286, 614 P. 2d 825, 828, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 986 (1980), that aspect of Apprendi was not at issue.
↑ Because respondent filed his habeas petition before the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 1214, the provisions of that Act do not apply. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336–337 (1997).
↑ The State also sought certiorari on the ground that there was no Apprendi violation because the prior conviction aggravator, exempt from Apprendi under Almendarez Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), was sufficient standing alone to authorize the death penalty. We denied certiorari on that issue, 540 U.S. 1045 (2003), and express no opinion on it.

[1] Because Arizona law already required aggravating factors to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, see State v. Jordan, 126 Ariz. 283, 286, 614 P. 2d 825, 828, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 986 (1980), that aspect of Apprendi was not at issue.

[2] Because respondent filed his habeas petition before the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 1214, the provisions of that Act do not apply. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336–337 (1997).

[3] The State also sought certiorari on the ground that there was no Apprendi violation because the prior conviction aggravator, exempt from Apprendi under Almendarez Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), was sufficient standing alone to authorize the death penalty. We denied certiorari on that issue, 540 U.S. 1045 (2003), and express no opinion on it.

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