Page:United States Reports, Volume 542.djvu/650

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Cite as: 542 U.S. 600 (2004)
611

Opinion of Souter, J.

The upshot of all this advice is a question first practice of some popularity, as one can see from the reported cases describing its use, sometimes in obedience to departmental policy.[1]

IV

When a confession so obtained is offered and challenged, attention must be paid to the conflicting objects of Miranda and question first. Miranda addressed "interrogation practices. . .likely. . .to disable [an individual] from making a free and rational choice" about speaking, 384 U.S., at 464–465, and held that a suspect must be "adequately and effectively" advised of the choice the Constitution guarantees, id., at 467. The object of question first is to render Miranda warnings ineffective by waiting for a particularly opportune time to give them, after the suspect has already confessed.

Just as "no talismanic incantation [is] required to satisfy [Miranda's] strictures," California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359 (1981) (per curiam), it would be absurd to think that mere recitation of the litany suffices to satisfy Miranda in every conceivable circumstance. "The inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably 'conve[y] to [a suspect] his rights as required by Miranda.'" Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989) (quoting Prysock, supra, at 361). The threshold issue when interrogators question first and warn later is thus whether it would be reasonable to find that in these circumstances the warnings could function "effec-


    470 U.S. 298 (1985), involved an officer's good faith failure to warn. See, e. g., Inbau, Reid, & Buckley 241 (Elstad's "facts as well as [its] specific holding" instruct that "where an interrogator has failed to administer the Miranda warnings in the mistaken belief that, under the circumstances of the particular case, the warnings were not required,. . .corrective measures. . .salvage an interrogation opportunity").

  1. See, e. g., [[United States v. Orso|United States v. Orso}}, 266 F.3d 1030, 1032–1033 (CA9 2001) (en banc); Pope v. Zenon, 69 F.3d 1018, 1023–1024 (CA9 1995), overruled by Orso, supra; Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1224–1227, 1249 (CA9 1992) (en banc); United States v. Carter, 884 F. 2d 368, 373 (CA9 1989); United States v. Esquilin, 208 F.3d 315, 317 (CA1 2000); Davis v. United States, 724 A. 2d 1163, 1165–1166 (D. C. App. 1998).