Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment
world of criminal law enforcement the administrative simplicity of the familiar has significant advantages over a more complex exclusionary rule. Cf. post, at 628–629 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
I believe the plurality's approach in practice will function as a "fruits" test. The truly "effective" Miranda warnings on which the plurality insists, ante, at 615, will occur only when certain circumstances—a lapse in time, a change in location or interrogating officer, or a shift in the focus of the questioning—intervene between the unwarned questioning and any postwarning statement. Cf. Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 690 (1982) (evidence obtained subsequent to a constitutional violation must be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree" unless "intervening events break the causal connection").
I consequently join the plurality's opinion in full. I also agree with Justice Kennedy's opinion insofar as it is consistent with this approach and makes clear that a good faith exception applies. See post, at 622 (opinion concurring in judgment).
Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment.
The interrogation technique used in this case is designed to circumvent Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). It undermines the Miranda warning and obscures its meaning. The plurality opinion is correct to conclude that statements obtained through the use of this technique are inadmissible. Although I agree with much in the careful and convincing opinion for the plurality, my approach does differ in some respects, requiring this separate statement.
The Miranda rule has become an important and accepted element of the criminal justice system. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). At the same time, not every violation of the rule requires suppression of the evidence obtained. Evidence is admissible when the central
