Opinion in Chambers
In evaluating the validity of the prior restraint, the Colorado Supreme Court made clear that the government's "interest of the highest order" in preventing publication applied only to those portions of "the in camera transcripts that are not relevant and material under the rape shield statute." Id., at 626. Two days after the Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion, the applicants submitted their application for a stay of the trial court's and the Colorado Supreme Court's orders, directing it to me as Circuit Justice.
On July 23, the same day that responses to the application were filed in this Court, the Colorado trial court issued its ruling on the admissibility of evidence under the Colorado rape shield statute. See Order re: Defendant's Motion to Admit Evidence Pursuant to C.R.S. §18–3–407 and People's Motions in Limine #5 and #7 in People v. Bryant, No. 03–CR–204 (Dist. Ct., Eagle Cty., July 23, 2004). According to this ruling (which affects all of the hearings held in camera pursuant to the rape shield statute, not just those at issue in this application) the trial court
"determines that certain evidence . . . is relevant to a material issue(s) in this case . . . and will permit the evidence to be offered at the trial of this matter. The Court determines that certain other evidence . . . is not relevant to any material issue in this case, and therefore may not be offered at the trial of this matter, unless circumstances later warrant." Id., at 5–6.
The ruling goes on to specify the evidence that is relevant and material. To my knowledge, the trial court has not yet made its determination as to whether the transcripts of June 21 and 22, in whole or in part, shall be made public. My reading of the transcripts leads me to believe that the trial court's determination as to the relevancy of the rape shield material will significantly change the circumstances that have led to this application. As a result of that determination, the trial court may decide to release the tran-
