PUBLIC LAW 107-210—AUG. 6, 2002 116 STAT. 1001 (C) to seek adherence by panels convened under the Dispute Settlement Understanding and by the Appellate Body to the standard of review applicable under the Uruguay Round Agreement involved in the dispute, including greater deference, where appropriate, to the fact-finding and technical expertise of national investigating authorities; (D) to seek provisions encouraging the early identification and settlement of disputes through consultation; (E) to seek provisions to encourage the provision of trade-expanding compensation if a party to a dispute under the agreement does not come into compliance with its obligations under the agreement; (F) to seek provisions to impose a penalty upon a party to a dispute under the agreement that— (i) encourages compliance with the obligations of the agreement; (ii) is appropriate to the parties, nature, subject matter, and scope of the violation; and (iii) has the aim of not adversely affecting parties or interests not party to the dispute while maintaining the effectiveness of the enforcement mechanism; and (G) to seek provisions that treat United States principal negotiating objectives equally with respect to— (i) the ability to resort to dispute settlement under the applicable agreement; (ii) the availability of equivalent dispute settlement procedures; and (iii) the availability of equivalent remedies. (13) WTO EXTENDED NEGOTIATIONS. — The principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding trade in civil aircraft are those set forth in section 135(c) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3355(c)) and regarding rules of origin are the conclusion of an agreement described in section 132 of that Act (19 U.S.C. 3552). (14) TRADE REMEDY LAWS.— The principal negotiating objectives of the United States with respect to trade remedy laws are— (A) to preserve the ability of the United States to enforce rigorously its trade laws, including the antidumping, countervailing duty, and safeguard laws, and avoid agreements that lessen the effectiveness of domestic and international disciplines on unfair trade, especially dumping and subsidies, or that lessen the effectiveness of domestic and international safeguard provisions, in order to ensure that United States workers, agricultural producers, and firms can compete fully on fair terms and enjoy the benefits of reciprocal trade concessions; and (B) to address and remedy market distortions that lead to dumping and subsidization, including overcapacity, cartelization, and market-access barriers. (15) BORDER TAXES.— The principal negotiating objective of the United States regarding border taxes is to obtain a revision of the WTO rules with respect to the treatment of border adjustments for internal taxes to redress the disadvantage to countries relying primarily on direct taxes for revenue rather than indirect taxes.
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