12 2 STA T .3 1 5PUBLIC LA W 11 0– 1 8 1 —J A N .28 , 2008 ther e qui re m e n t sof meetin g the Na tiona lM ilitar yS trategy .(C)T heo p timal mi x ofC –5 an d C– 17 air c raft for the strategic airlift fleet of the A ir F orce , to include the follo w ing
(i) The cost - effecti v eness of moderni z ing various iterations of the C–5A and C–5 B/ C aircraft fleet versus procuring additional C–17 aircraft. (ii) The military capa b ility, operational avail- ability, usefulness, and service life of the C–5A/B/C/ M aircraft and the C–17 aircraft. Such an assessment shall examine appropriate metrics, such as aircraft availability rates, departure rates, and mission capable rates, in each of the following cases: ( I ) Completion of the Avionics Modernization P rogram and the R eliability E nhancement and Re- engining Program. (II) Partial completion of the Avionics Mod- ernization Program and the Reliability Enhance- ment and Re-engining Program, with partial completion of either such program being considered the point at which the continued execution of each program is no longer supported by the cost- effectiveness analysis. (iii) At what specific fleet inventory for each organic aircraft, to include air refueling aircraft used in the airlift role, would it impede the ability of Civil Reserve Air Fleet participants to remain a viable aug- mentation option. ( D ) An analysis and assessment of the lessons that may be learned from the experience of the Air Force in restarting the production line for the C–5 aircraft after having closed the line for several years, and recommenda- tions for the actions that the Department of Defense should ta k e to ensure that the production line for the C–17 aircraft could be restarted if necessary, including — (i) an analysis of the methods that were used and costs that were incurred in closing and re-opening the production line for the C–5 aircraft
(ii) an assessment of the methods and actions that should be employed and the expected costs and risks of closing and re-opening the production line for the C–17 aircraft in view of that experience. Such analysis and assessment should deal with issues such as production work force, production facilities, tooling, industrial base suppliers, contractor logistics support versus organic maintenance, and diminished manufac- turing sources. (E) Assessing the military capability, operational avail- ability, usefulness, service life and optimal mix of intra- theater airlift aircraft, to include— (i) the cost-effectiveness of procuring the J oint Cargo Aircraft versus procuring additional C–1 30 Jor refurbishing C–130E/ H platforms to meet intra-theater airlift requirements of the combatant commander and component commands; and
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