laws of the state of Virginia, as they now exist, shall be and continue in force in that part of the District of Columbia, which was ceded by the said state to the United States, and by them accepted for the permanent seat of government; and that the laws of the state of Maryland,
9. An act altering the times of holding the circuit courts in the District of Columbia, May 20, 1826, chap. 131.
10. An act to establish a criminal court in the District of Columbia, July 7, 1838, chap. 192. 11. An act to restrain the circulation of small notes as a currency in the District of Columbia, and for other purposes, July 7, 1838, chap. 212. 12. Resolution directing the manner in which certain laws of the District of Columbia shall be executed, March 2, 1839.13. An act for granting possessions, enrolling conveyances and securing the estates of purchasers within the District of Columbia, May 31, 1832, chap. 112. 14. An act changing the times of holding the courts in the District of Columbia, May 31, 1832, chap. 114. Act of February 30, 1839, chap. 30. The decisions of the courts of the United States upon this and other statutes relating to the District of Columbia, and other questions arising in the district, have been: The act of Congress of 27 February, 1801, concerning the District of Columbia, directs that writs of error shall be prosecuted in the same manner, under the same regulations, and the same proceedings shall be had thereon, as is or shall be provided in case of writs of error on judgments, or appeals upon orders or decrees, rendered in the circuit courts of the United States. United States v. Hooe et al., 1 Cranch, 318; 1 Cond. Rep. 322. By the separation of the District of Columbia from the state of Maryland, the residents in that part of Maryland which became a part of the district ceased to be citizens of the state. Reilly, Appellant v. Lamar et al., 2 Cranch, 344; 1 Cond. Rep. 419. A citizen of the District of Columbia, could not be discharged by the insolvent law of Maryland, out of the district. Ibid. A citizen of the District of Columbia, cannot maintain an action in the circuit court of the United States, out of the district; he not being a citizen of a state within the meaning of the provision in the law of the United States, regulating the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States. Hepburn and Dundas v. Ellzey, 2 Cranch, 445; 1 Cond. Rep. 444. A justice of the peace, in the District of Columbia, is an officer of the government of the United States; and is exempt from militia duty. Wise v. Withers, 3 Cranch, 331; 1 Cond. Rep. 552. Under the sixth and eighth sections of the act of assembly of Virginia, of the 22d of December, 1794, property pledged to the Mutual Assurance Society, &c. continues liable for assessments, on account of the losses insured against, in the hands of a bona fide purchaser, without notice. The Mutual Assurance Society v. Watts’ Ex’rs, 1 Wheat. 279; 3 Cond. Rep. 570. A mere change of sovereignty produces no change in the state of rights existing in the soil; and the cession of the District of Columbia to the national government did not affect the lien created by the above act on real property situate in the town of Alexandria; though the personal character or liability of a member of the society could not be thereby forced on a purchaser of such property. Ibid. Congress has authority to impose a direct tax on the District of Columbia, in proportion to the census directed to be taken by the Constitution. Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 317; 4 Cond. Rep. 660. Congress, when legislating for the District of Columbia, under the fifth section of the first article of the constitution, is still the legislature of the Union, and its acts are the laws of the United States. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264; 5 Cond. Rep. 90. An act of the legislature of Maryland, passed the 19th of December, 1791, entitled “An act concerning the territory of Columbia, and the city of Washington,” which, by the 6th section, provides for the holding of lands by “foreigners,” is an enabling act; and applies to those only who could not take lands without the provisions of that law. It enables a “foreigner” to take in the same manner as if he were a citizen. Spratt v. Spratt, 1 Peters, 349. A foreigner who becomes a citizen, is no longer a foreigner, within the view of the act. Thus, after purchase, lands vested in him as a citizen; not by virtue of the act of the legislature of Maryland, but because of his acquiring the rights of citizenship. Ibid. Land in the county of Washington, and District of Columbia, purchased by a foreigner, before naturalization, was held by him under the law of Maryland, and might be transmitted to the relations of the purchasers, who were foreigners; and the capacity so to transmit those lands, is given, absolutely, by this act, and is not affected by his becoming a citizen; but passes to his heirs and relations, precisely as if he had remained a foreigner. Ibid. The supreme court of the United States has jurisdiction of appeals from the orphans’ court, through the circuit court for the county of Washington, by virtue of the act of Congress of February 13, 1801; and by the act of Congress subsequently passed, the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, must exceed the value of one thousand dollars, in order to entitle the party to an appeal. Nicholls et al. v. Hodges’ Ex’rs, 1 Peters, 565. The statute of Elizabeth is in force in the District of Columbia. Cathcart et al. v. Robinson, 5 Peters, 264. The levy court of Washington county is not entitled to one half of all the fines, penalties, and forfeitures imposed by the circuit court in cases at common law, and under the acts of Congress, as well as the acts of assembly of Maryland, adopted by Congress as the law of the District of Columbia. Levy Court of Washington v. Ringgold, 5 Peters, 451. The supreme court of the United States has no jurisdiction of causes brought before it, upon a certificate of division of opinion of the judges of the circuit court for the District of Columbia. The appellate jurisdiction, in respect to that court, extends only to its final judgments and decrees. Ross v. Triplett. 3 Wheat. 600; 4 Cond. Rep. 351. By the insolvent law of Maryland, of January 3, 1800, the chancellor of Maryland could not discharge one who was an inhabitant of the District of Columbia, after the separation from Maryland, unless previous
