Harris is “troubled with aphasia”; but this allegation is set forth as an excuse for his desertion, and not as explaining why Harris did not sign and verify the petition or complaint (as it should more aptly be called), in accordance with U. S. Compiled Statutes, § 1282 (R. S. § 754), which reads as follows:
“Sec. 1282. Application for—Application for writ of habeas corpus shall be made to the court, or justice, or judge authorized to issue the same, by complaint in writing, signed by the person for whose relief it is intended, setting forth the facts concerning the detention of the party restrained, in whose custody he is detained, and by virtue of what claim or authority, if known. The facts set forth in the complaint shall be verified by the oath of the person making the application.”
The provisions of the section quoted, supra, indicate that it was not intended that a writ of habeas corpus should be allowed on the application of any person whomsoever without explanation as to why the complaint was not signed “by the person for whose relief” the writ “is intended.”
The practice of a next friend applying for a writ is ancient and fully accepted: There are many instances and circumstances under which it may not be possible nor feasible that the detained person shall sign and verify the complaint. Inability to understand the English language or the situation, particularly in the case of aliens, impossibility of access to the person, or mental incapacity are all illustrations of a proper use of the “next friend” application. In re Ferrens, Fed. Cas. No. 4,746, Judge Blatchford, entertained an application made by the wife of an enlisted soldier and briefly summed up the practice as follows:
“It is claimed on the part of the United States that the writ must be dismissed, because it is not prosecuted by the recruit himself; that no one can prosecute it but himself, unless it be shown that he is debarred the opportunity of preferring a petition himself; and that such fact is not shown in this case. It has never been understood that, at common law, authority from a person unlawfully imprisoned or deprived of his liberty was necessary to warrant the issuing of a habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause of his detention. In the case of People v. Mercein, 3 Hill, 399, 407, the Supreme Court of New York intimate that such authority from the person detained is not ordinarily necessary. In case of Ashby, 14 How. St. Tr. 814, the House of Lords, in England, in 1704, resolved ‘that every Englishman, who is imprisoned by any authority whatsoever, has an undoubted right, by his agents or friends, to apply for and obtain a writ of habeas corpus, in order to procure his liberty by due course of law.’ This resolution was assented to by the house of commons. Id. 826. In the present case, the petitioner states, in her petition, that she is the wife of the recruit, and is dependent upon him for support. This is, I think, sufficient to authorize her to prosecute the writ.”
But the complaint must set forth some reason or explanation satisfactory to the court showing why the detained person does not sign and verify the complaint and who “the next friend” is. It was not intended that the writ of habeas corpus should be availed of, as matter of course, by intruders or uninvited meddlers, styling themselves next friends. Gusman v. Marrero, 180 U. S. 81, 21 Sup. Ct. 293, 45 L. Ed. 436.
The case at bar well illustrates the desirability of making clear that applications of this character should not be entertained. There is noth-
