Jackson, J., dissenting
particular piece of purported child pornography with the intent of initiating a transfer” is properly proscribed by federal statute. Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U. S. 234, 253 (2002) (“The mere tendency of speech to encourage unlawful acts is not a sufficient reason for banning it”).
B
The Government does not dispute that the encouragement provision is unconstitutional as overbroad if it is read according to its plain text, thereby reaching these various fact patterns. This point is worth repeating: Under the broad interpretation of the statute, the Government does not even attempt to argue that the unconstitutional applications in category one are not “substantial,” Stevens, 559 U. S., at 473, in relation to the constitutional applications that fall in category two.[1] Rather, the Government argues that the statute can be saved from falling victim to today’s overbreadth challenge by construing the broad terms of the encouragement provision narrowly—and, in particular, reading them as authorizing prosecution only for solicitation or facilitation.
Citing this Court’s general duty “to seek harmony, not to manufacture conflict,” when “legislation and the Constitution brush up against each other,” ante, at 16–17, the majority obliges. But this Court also has a duty to refrain from taking the legislative reins and revising the text of a statute. It is well established that “[w]e will not rewrite a law to conform it to constitutional requirements.” Stevens, 559 U. S., at 481 (emphasis added; alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, and in the overbreadth
- ↑ There is accordingly no need to dwell on the contents of category two here. The majority discusses several examples, like “issuing fraudulent Social Security numbers to noncitizens.” Ante, at 17 (citing Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F. 3d 1276, 1295–1297 (CA11 2010)).
