Jackson, J., dissenting
a particular unlawful act,” ante, at 6 (emphasis added). But the encouragement provision hints at no such thing. It simply prohibits “encourag[ing] or induc[ing]” a noncitizen “to come to, enter, or reside in the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such coming to, entry, or residence is or will be in violation of law.” §1324(a)(1)(A)(iv). Nor does the ordinary meaning of “encourages or induces” carry the intent requirement that solicitation and facilitation do: By describing the attractions of my hometown, for instance, I might end up inducing a listener to move there, even if that was not my intent.
It is also telling that the very next subdivision of §1324(a)(1)(A) expressly prohibits “aid[ing] or abet[ting] the commission of any of the preceding acts.” §1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(II). That provision indicates that Congress knows how to create an aiding-and-abetting prohibition when it wants to—and that it did not do so in §1324(a)(1)(A)(iv).[1]
The majority’s mere observation that the encouragement provision’s terms are used to define solicitation and facilitation is thus insufficient to establish that the terms mean the same thing or incorporate the same features.
B
The majority next turns to “[s]tatutory history” to support its transformation of the broad encouragement provision that Congress wrote into a narrow solicitation or aiding-and-abetting prohibition. Ante, at 11. I agree that the history of a statute can reveal Congress’s intent to use terms in a narrower or specialized manner. But, here
- ↑ This is not a surplusage argument. Cf. ante, at 15, n. 2. I agree with the majority that clause (iv) and clause (v)(II) have different aims. My point, instead, is that Congress’s failure to use the classic “aids or abets” language in clause (iv), which it deploys just next door in clause (v)(II), should give us pause before concluding that we can read clause (iv) as if it included the same terms.
