been permitted to state his claims with greater specificity. The government counters that district courts do not have a duty sua sponte to give § 2255 movants a chance to amend their motions.
We agree. A district court does not err in declining to offer sua sponte a § 2255 movant an opportunity to amend.
In most of the cases that Hernandez-Zavala cites in support of his contention, the movants sought leave to amend before the dismissal of their § 2255 motions.[1] He also cites one other published opinion, United States v. Martinez, 181 F.3d 627 (5th Cir. 1999), to support his position. Although Martinez vacated and remanded to allow the movant to “state with greater specificity his complaints,” the court did not purport to impose a universal duty on district courts to provide sua sponte the chance to amend deficient § 2255 motions. Id. at 629. Indeed, Martinez did not address whether the movant had requested leave to amend before the dismissal. See id. at 628. Thus, Martinez does not establish a requirement to offer sua sponte a movant the opportunity to amend.
Moreover, Hernandez-Zavala fails to state how he would cure his § 2255 motion if given the chance to amend. Outside the § 2255 context, we have held repeatedly that a district court does not abuse its discretion in dismissing complaints where a plaintiff does not explain how he or she would amend. See, e.g., Benfield v. Magee, 945 F.3d 333, 339–40 (5th Cir. 2019). Although he requests the opportunity to state his claims with more specificity, Hernandez-Zavala does not explain what facts he would allege to do so.
- ↑ See Riascos, 76 F.3d at 94−95; United States v. Rice, No. 99-20751, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 39531, at *1 (5th Cir. Dec. 27, 1999) (per curiam) (unpublished); United v. Alcantar, No. 98-20932, 1999 WL 422955, at *1 (5th Cir. May 25, 1999) (per curiam) (unpublished). In each of those cases, the movant either requested leave to amend before dismissal or included pleadings that reasonably should have been interpreted as requests to amend.
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