Page:United States v. Texas (2023).pdf/16

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Cite as: 599 U. S. ____ (2023)

13

Opinion of the Court

See, e.g., American Hospital Assn. v. Becerra, 596 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2022) (slip op., at 9–14); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 586 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2018) (slip op., at 8–15); Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U. S. 189, 196–201 (2012); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U. S. 557, 592–595, 613–615, 635 (2006); id., at 636–646 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 637–638, 640 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).

This case is categorically different, however, because it implicates only one discrete aspect of the executive power—namely, the Executive Branch’s traditional discretion over whether to take enforcement actions against violators of federal law. And this case raises only the narrow Article III standing question of whether the Federal Judiciary may in effect order the Executive Branch to take enforcement actions against violators of federal law—here, by making more arrests. Under this Court’s Article III precedents and the historical practice, the answer is no.^[1]

It bears emphasis that the question of whether the federal courts have jurisdiction under Article III is distinct from the question of whether the Executive Branch is complying with the relevant statutes—here, §1226(c) and §1231(a)(2). In other words, the question of reviewability is different from the question of legality. We take no position on whether the Executive Branch here is complying with its legal obligations under §1226(c) and §1231(a)(2). We hold

↑ As part of their argument for standing, the States also point to Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U. S. 497 (2007). Putting aside any disagreements that some may have with Massachusetts v. EPA, that decision does not control this case. The issue there involved a challenge to the denial of a statutorily authorized petition for rulemaking, not a challenge to an exercise of the Executive’s enforcement discretion. Id., at 520, 526; see also id., at 527 (noting that there are “key differences between a denial of a petition for rulemaking and an agency’s decision not to initiate an enforcement action” and that “an agency’s refusal to initiate enforcement proceedings is not ordinarily subject to judicial review”).

[1] As part of their argument for standing, the States also point to Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U. S. 497 (2007). Putting aside any disagreements that some may have with Massachusetts v. EPA, that decision does not control this case. The issue there involved a challenge to the denial of a statutorily authorized petition for rulemaking, not a challenge to an exercise of the Executive’s enforcement discretion. Id., at 520, 526; see also id., at 527 (noting that there are “key differences between a denial of a petition for rulemaking and an agency’s decision not to initiate an enforcement action” and that “an agency’s refusal to initiate enforcement proceedings is not ordinarily subject to judicial review”).

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