Alito, J., dissenting
the District Court did here. It vacated the Final Memorandum pending further action by DHS, id., at 499, but it declined to issue injunctive or declaratory relief, id., at 501–502.
The Government asked the Court of Appeals to stay the District Court’s order vacating the Final Memorandum, but that court refused to do so and observed that the Government had not “come close” to showing “ ‘clear error’ ” in the District Court’s factual findings on the injuries that Texas had already incurred and would continue to incur because of the Final Memorandum. 40 F. 4th 205, 216–217 (CA5 2022).
II
Before I address the Court’s inexplicable break from our ordinary standing analysis, I will first explain why Texas easily met its burden to show a concrete, particularized injury that is traceable to the Final Memorandum and redressable by the courts. Lujan, 504 U. S., at 560–561.
A
Injury in fact. The District Court’s factual findings, which must be accepted unless clearly erroneous, quantified the cost of criminal supervision of aliens who should have been held in DHS custody and also identified other burdens that Texas had borne and would continue to bear going forward. These findings sufficed to establish a concrete injury that was specific to Texas. TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 9); see ante, at 4 (conceding that such costs are “of course an injury”).
Traceability. The District Court found that each category of cost would increase “because of the Final Memorandum,” rather than decisions that DHS personnel would make irrespective of the directions that memorandum contains. 606 F. Supp. 3d, at 460, 464, 465 (emphasis added).
The majority does not hold—and in my judgment, could
