Alito, J., dissenting
B
While the majority does not contest redressability, Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence does, citing two reasons. But the first is contrary to precedent, and the second should not be addressed in this case.
The first asserted reason is based on the inability of the lower courts to issue a broad injunction forbidding enforcement of the Final Memorandum. See §1252(f)(1).[1] In this case, the District Court did not issue injunctive relief. Instead, it vacated the Final Memorandum, and Justice Gorsuch argues that this relief did not redress Texas’s injuries because it does not “require federal officials to change how they exercise [their prosecutorial] discretion in the [Final Memorandum’s] Guidelines’ absence.” Ante, at 6. There are two serious problems with this argument.
First, §1252(f)(1) bars injunctive relief by courts “other than the Supreme Court.” (Emphasis added.) As a result, redress in the form of an injunction can be awarded by this Court. According to the Court’s decision last Term in Biden v. Texas, our authority to grant such relief “le[ft] no doubt” as to our jurisdiction even if §1252(f)(1) precluded the lower courts from setting aside an administrative action under the APA. 597 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 10). We have not been asked to revisit this holding, see id., at ___–___ (Barrett, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 3–4), and I would not do so here.
Second, even if Biden v. Texas could be distinguished and
- ↑ Section 1252(f)(1) reads in full:
“Regardless of the nature of the action or claim or of the identity of the party or parties bringing the action, no court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of the provisions of part IV of this subchapter, as amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, other than with respect to the application of such provisions to an individual alien against whom proceedings under such part have been initiated.”
