nial law alone, nor the civil or judicial law alone; but all combined together constituted that code, of which each was a constituent part.
Has this Jewish code, as a code, as a whole, "expired, by its own limitations, at the coming of Christ"? Where are those limitations marked or recorded? Nowhere. Or can it be, with propriety, said, as it is said by the Puritan, that "none of its precepts have any force derived from the circumstance that they stand in that code?" The very fact of their standing in that code, written under the inspiration and by the authority of the Most High, imparted to them a binding force over the conscience. To feel their force, it was not necessary for a Jew to inquire in regard to "the inherent justice and adaptedness seen to reside in those precepts." To an intelligent and pious Jew, it was sufficient to find a precept in the code which God had given to His Church by Moses, to convince him it was obligatory, and ought to be obeyed. He would, indeed, perceive a difference in the precepts of this Divine code, and know and feel some to be more important than others; and that, when they came in conflict, or, in other words, when both
