Cite as 895 F.Supp. 1329 (D.Ariz. 1995)
fense. In particular, the defendant states that “[e]ach of the purported claims infringes the Defendant’s rights to religious freedom under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and the prohibition placed upon the Congress of the United States in making laws respecting the establishment of religion or the free exercise thereof.” ((Revised) Def’s Substitute 2nd Am. Answer & Countercl. at 5, ¶1.) [hereinafter Def.’s Answer] The defendant also claims that this court is barred from granting any of the plaintiff’s requested relief “because the granting of such relief would constitute a violation of the Defendant’s right of freedom of speech." Id. at ¶2.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard applied to a motion for partial summary judgment is identical to the standard applied to adjudicate a case fully by summary judgment. The motion shall be granted when, viewing the facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and … the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 532 F.2d 674, 683 n. 11 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940, 97 S.Ct. 355, 50 L.Ed.2d 309 (1976). A genuine issue of material fact exists when there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510–11, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citing First Nat. Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968)). If the moving party meets the initial burden of establishing the nonexistence of a genuine issue, then the burden shifts to the opposing party to produce evidence of the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). “If the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S., at 249–50, 106 S.Ct. at 2510–11 (citations omitted).
III. LEGAL DISCUSSION
Particular facts upon which I have relied heavily must be initially emphasized. First, the plaintiff possesses certificates of copyright and trademark registration for the property at issue. (Pl’s Compl. at Ex. A–F.) The certificates alone constitute prima facie evidence of the validity of the registration, ownership of the property, and the exclusive right to its use. Remick Music Corp. v. Interstate Hotel Co. of Neb., 58 F.Supp. 523, 581 (D.Neb.1944), aff’d, 157 F.2d 744 (8th Cir.1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 809, 67 S.Ct. 622, 91 L.Ed. 691 (1947); 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1988); Curtis-Stephens-Embry Co. v. Pro-Tek-Toe Skate Stop Co., 199 F.2d 407, 413 (8th Cir.1952); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1057, 1115(a) (1988). Therefore, the defendant, claiming that the copyright and trademarks are invalid, has the burden of overcoming this presumption. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int’l Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 523 (9th Cir.1984); Sylvania Elec. Prods. Inc. v. Dura Elec. Lamp Co., 247 F.2d 730, 732 (3d Cir.1957). Second, although the defendant argues that enforcing the copyright and trademark laws will violate her constitutional rights to free speech and religion, she does not in any way question the laws’ constitutionality. Third, the defendant “does not dispute the proposition that religious organizations can hold valid trademarks; she does not dispute that religious organizations can hold valid copyrights, or that works on the subject of religion can be the subject of a valid copyright.” (Def.’s Mem. in Opp'n to PL’s Mot. for Partial Summ.J. on First Amendment Defense at 1–2.) [hereinafter Def.’s Br.]
Upon reviewing the record before me, I glean two basic assertions by the defendant. One, the copyright to The URANTIA Book and each of the trademarks at issue are invalid; and two, if the court rules in favor of enforcing an invalid copyright or trademark, the court, not the plaintiff, will be violating her constitutional rights to freedom of religion and speech. The first contention has yet to be proven, and the second is premature and more properly an issue for any future appeal rather than an affirmative defense in the instant case.
