In non-jury cases such as this one, “the district judge is given great latitude in the admission or exclusion of evidence.” Hollinger v. United States, 651 F.2d 636, 640 (9th Cir. 1981). The Supreme Court has said that district courts have “broad latitude” to determine whether expert testimony is sufficiently reliable to be admitted. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 153 (1999). And “we give particularly wide latitude to the district court’s discretion to issue sanctions under Rule 37(c)(1),” which is “a recognized broadening of the sanctioning power.” Yeti by Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001); see also R & R Sails, 673 F.3d at 1245 (same); Jeff D. v. Otter, 643 F.3d 278, 289 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[A] district court has wide discretion in controlling discovery.”) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A
We first address the exclusion of defense experts. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony. It provides that a witness “qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if”:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
