Fourth, the district court found no evidence that Sweetwater had “addressed or implemented policies or procedures designed to cure the myriad areas of general noncompliance with Title IX.” In light of the systemic problem of gender inequity in the Castle Park athletics program, the district court did not abuse its discretion by issuing an injunction requiring Sweetwater to comply with Title IX.
IV
We review de novo a district court’s decision to deny a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.[1] See Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d 1196, 1198 (9th Cir. 2010). Similarly, whether a party has standing to bring a claim is a question of law that we review de novo. See Jewel v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 673 F.3d 902, 907 (9th Cir. 2011). But we review a district court’s fact-finding on standing questions for clear error. See In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 741, 747 (9th Cir. 2012).
Article III of the Constitution requires a party to have standing to bring its suit. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). The elements of standing are well-established: the party must have suffered (1) an “injury in fact—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”; (2) “there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of,” meaning the injury has to be “fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant”; and (3) “it must be
- ↑ Because the district court construed Sweetwater’s motion to strike Plaintiffs’ Title IX retaliation claim as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss that claim, see Ollier, 735 F. Supp. 2d at 1224, we do the same.
