Long since it had been agreed among the Spaniards that the city must be evacuated; time and method were the only questions. The former of these was now resolved on by the council: it should be this very night. It was safer to meet the issue now than later. The enemy was hourly reinforced. Perilous indeed was the undertaking to pass with luggage, war stores, prisoners, and women over the broken causeway in the darkness; but to remain was death. Botello, the astrologer, had declared for this time, and so it was determined. For Botello was wise and prudent, knowing Latin and the stars; he had foretold the greatness of Cortés, and had recommended his night attack on Narvaez, and general and soldiers believed in him.[1] Had he lived a century or two later his words might have been employed as the vox stellarum by the almanac makers. The Mexicans had said that they would make it a time of sore distress, any attempted escape of the intruders, a time when men must struggle, and women would pray and weep; and if so, it were no worse for the fugitives that black night should fling her mantle over the bloody scene.
Since the Indians were supposed to have destroyed the crossing at the causeway channels, a portable
- ↑ Botello. . . .afirmò que. . . .supiessen que moriria el o su hermano, y algunos de la cõpañia, y qui se saluaria el Capitan, y otros muchos, y ninguno si salian de dia.' Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. xi. Hora lo creyesen, hora no.' Gomara, Hist. Mex., 159. 'Anteponendo le vane osservazioni di quel meschino Soldato alla luce della prudenza militare,' is the indignant comment of Clavigero, Storia Mess., iii. 135. But there is no doubt that 'military prudence' had more weight in the matter than Botello's words, and that the result was not due to his advice. Solis casts the blame of crediting the 'ignorant charlatan' Botello chiefly on the majority of the council, to whom Cortés yielded. Hist. Mex., ii. 171-2. In order to lull any suspicions among the Mexicans, says Bernal Diaz, a leading priest and some other captives were sent to the Mexican camp with a proposal to surrender all the gold if the Spaniards were allowed to leave in peace eight days later. Hist. Verdad., 105.
day of evacuating Mexico, and the day following the surrender of Montezuma's body. Herrera, who is far more confused, has a sally on this day in three directions, one being the Tlacopan road; but the operations on the latter route are only partially told, and the rest referred to the third day of the siege. There are also several contradictions to aid in confusing the many who follow him. Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. xi. Prescott abandons himself to the guidance of Clavigero for the occurrences of these days, but embellishes the narrative with some incidents belonging to the siege of Alvarado.
