Page:Vol 1 History of Mexico by H H Bancroft.djvu/788

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CONTINUATION OF THE SIEGE.

of Ponce de Leon's Florida expedition.[1] The war stores were particularly valuable; so low had run the actual stock that Cortés was preparing more Chinantec pikes to cover the deficiency in weapons.

Everything was again ready for a serious revival of hostilities. Over six weeks had passed since the siege began, and the end seemed little nearer than before. On the day of the defeat three fourths of the city might be said to have been reduced; but nearly all this advantage had been lost, owing chiefly to the narrow streets, encompassed by houses which served both for attack and retreat, and the numerous traps in the form of canals and channels. So long as these obstacles remained the progress must not only be slow, ever slower as advance was made, but the troops would be constantly exposed to fresh disaster. One more defeat might ruin all, and Cortés resolved to avoid risks. He would tear down every building as he advanced on both sides of the streets, and fill up channel; "not take one step in advance without leaving all desolated behind, and convert water into firm land, regardless of the delay." So writes the general, and yet he expresses regret for this destruction of the city, "the most beautiful in the world."[2] In pursuance of this plan he asked the allied chiefs to summon additional forces of laborers with the necessary implements. They eagerly consented, and within a few days the men stood prepared.

  1. Herrera intimates that the material may have been a consignment to Leon, for which the disappointed owner sought a market. A vessel of Aillon's fleet, says Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 153.
  2. Some time before he had expressed the same intention, and the fear that little or no treasure would be recovered. Cartas, 222, 241. Ixtlilxochitl claims that his namesake provided 100,000 men for the task, Hor. Crueldades, 42, and Bernal Diaz states that this prince proposed purely a strict blockade as a safe and sure plan. Hist. Verdad., 150. The result proves that this would have been the best and as speedy as the one adopted, while the city would have been saved from destruction. That the plan was ever seriously suggested among this impatient crew is affirmed by no other authority.