ble. The enthusiasm of the troops was stimulated by encouraging addresses; the necessity of discipline urgently pressed upon them; and drills and manœuvres were daily practised on the plains outside the city. Though their arms were far inferior to those of the royalists, they were better than on former occasions; most of them were still only the sling and bow, but for the former great quantities of small grenades had been manufactured missiles much more destructive than rough stones. A great improvement had also been effected in ridding the camp of hordes of unarmed hangers-on, who followed merely with a view to pillage.
With regard to the plan of operations, a diversity of opinion prevailed among the leaders. At a council of war Hidalgo expressed his conviction that the whole army ought to take up a position at the bridge of Tololotlan, and there engage Calleja, while Iriarte with his forces moving from Zacatecas should assail the royalists in the rear. Allende disapproved of this plan, and bearing in mind the disastrous results at Las Cruces and Guanajuato, expressed his want of confidence in directing their whole force against the enemy, arid exposing their fortunes to the hazard of a single battle. He proposed that several divisions should be formed out of the army, that Guadalajara should be evacuated, and that Calleja should be attacked by these corps d'armée consecutively, thus avoiding the risk of a general rout. The debate was long and warm, but eventually Hidalgo's plan was adopted.[1]
On the 13th of January, Hidalgo was advised that Calleja was advancing by forced marches toward Guadalajara; and he immediately made preparations to occupy the bridge of Calderon, eleven or twelve leagues from the city. On the following day Hidalgo led out his host. As he compared his now com-
- ↑ Bustamante, Cuad. Hist., i. 185; Alaman, Hist. Mej., ii. 114; Negrete, Mex. Sig. XIX., ii. 413.
