But the proximity of Morelos afforded the viceroy a pretext for hastening the departure of the troops; and on the 8th he issued orders for the army to march, at the same time explaining why he was compelled to act with such promptness. The position of the royalists as described by Venegas[1] was, indeed, serious. The capital was surrounded by bands of revolutionists; commerce with the interior was destroyed; communication with Vera Cruz and Oajaca was closed; transportation of quicksilver and gunpowder to the mines was no longer possible; and all intercourse with the port of Acapulco was cut off, causing additional commercial distress and a loss to the revenue of 1,000,000 pesos in duties payable on goods brought by the vessel from Manila. Scarcity of provisions and other commodities was severely felt in the capital, and the viceroy feared that even the roads to Texcoco and Toluca, the only ones left open, would shortly be closed. It was therefore indispensable that a decisive blow should be struck at Morelos, whom he regarded as the present head and front of the revolution.[2] The plan of operations which he gave to Calleja was based on the latest information. It arranged for simultaneous attacks on Izúcar and Cuautla, conducted respectively by Llano and Calleja.
The necessary instructions having been sent to Llano at Puebla, on the 10th of February Calleja's advance left for Chalco, whither troops of Morelos had already arrived, and on the 12th the main body moved forward. Pursuing the line of march indicated in his instructions,[3] Calleja encamped on the 17th at Pasulco, two leagues from Cuautla. Here Morelos, duly informed of the movements of the
- ↑ See copy of his instructions in Bustamante, Campañas de Calleja, 159-65.
- ↑ The viceroy's words are: 'Principal coriféo de la insurreccion en la actualidad, y podemos decir que ha sido en ella el génio de mayor firmeza, recursos y astucias.' Id., 161-2.
- ↑ The army passed through Chalco, Tenango, Ameca, Ozumba, and Atlatlauca. This route was selected as offering few obstacles to the passage of the artillery. Id., 163-4.
