had but only just arrived in India, and succeeded to a legacy in the form of a rebellion, bequeathed to him by his predecessor in office, such as, in the history of mankind, no mortal man ever had to contend with. With his inexperience, therefore, he was in no way answerable for the amazing blunders that were committed in the early days of the Mutiny. But “Officialdom” was responsible for those blunders, because “Officialdom” had passed the principal part of its life among the men with whom it had to deal, and with whom it ought to have known how to deal — more especially with those Sepoys who happened to be in garrison stations with European troops. Their teeth should have been drawn, without any discrimination, on the very first symptom of disloyalty, in the very first regiment of the native army. Disbandment, as has been seen, did more harm than good. Disarming, although it would not have stopped the Mutiny, would doubtless have had the effect of postponing it, and so enabled the Government to gain time, and prepare for the coming storm.
But, what with vacillation, hesitation, red-tapeism, and the infatuated cry of the commanding officers against disarming their “loyal men,” the contagious rumour of successful rebellion flew over Upper India with the rapidity of electricity, until the culminating point in the Mutiny having at length been reached, the consequences may easily be conceived. From that moment the darkened clouds of the impending storm began to close in and gather to a head, till they burst
