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490
[336


Charles A. "Jack" WALLS v. STATE of Arkansas


CR 98-521
986 S.W.2d 397
Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered March 4, 1999
[Petition for rehearing denied April 15, 1999.* ]


  1. CRIMINAL LAW—SENTENCING—RELEVANCY OF VICTIM-IMPACT EVIDENCE.—Arkansas case law has primarily dealt with the relevancy of victim-impact evidence in the context of murder victims; it has been held that relevant victim-impact evidence is evidence that informs the jury of the toll of the murder on the victim's family; when victim-impact evidence is unduly prejudicial, it may render the trial fundamentally unfair and violate the Due Process Clause.
  2. EVIDENCE—SENTENCING—VICTIM-IMPACT EVIDENCE GOVERNED BY RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY.—The circuit judge erred when he twice overruled objections by defense counsel and stated that the rules of evidence did not apply to sentencing hearings or to victim-impact evidence in particular; the evidence listed in Ark. Code Ann. § 16-97-103 (Supp. 1997), including victim-impact evidence, must be governed by the rules of admissibility and exclusion for the proceedings to pass constitutional muster.
  3. CRIMINAL LAW—SENTENCING—RELEVANT EVIDENCE BENCH TRIAL DIFFERENT FROM JURY TRIAL.—It has been emphasized in both civil and criminal cases that the circumstances of a bench trial are different with respect to relevant evidence because a judge is better equipped to sort out what is pertinent to the issue at hand.
  4. CRIMINAL LAW—SENTENCING—BENCH TRIAL—SUBSEQUENT OBJECTIONS TO TESTIMONY NOT NECESSARY.—Where evidence in a bench trial has been contested by defense counsel by a motion in limine and the motion has been overruled, unlike a jury trial, subsequent objections to the testimony are not necessary; if a contemporaneous objection is not made at the time the evidence is offered during a jury trial, the proverbial bell will have been rung and the jury prejudiced; however, when the contested evidence is mentioned during a bench trial, there is no risk of prejudice because a trial judge is able to consider evidence only for its proper purpose.
     *   Glaze, Corbin, and Smith, JJ., would grant.