Page:Warner Chappell Music, Inc. v. Nealy.pdf/7

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Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024)

5

Opinion of the Court

a plaintiff with a timely claim under the rule can get damages going back more than three years.^[1]

The text of the Copyright Act answers that question in favor of copyright plaintiffs. The Act’s statute of limitations provides in full: “No civil action shall be maintained under the provisions of this title unless it is commenced within three years after the claim accrued.” §507(b); see supra, at 2. That provision establishes a three-year period for filing suit, beginning to run when a claim accrues—here, we assume, upon its discovery. And that clock is a singular one. The “time-to-sue prescription,” as we have called it, establishes no separate three-year period for recovering damages, this one running from the date of infringement. Petrella, 572 U. S., at 686. If any time limit on damages exists, it must come from the Act’s remedial sections. But those provisions likewise do not aid a long-ago infringer. They state without qualification that an infringer is liable either for statutory damages or for the owner’s actual damages and the infringer’s profits. See §504(a)–(c). There is no time limit on monetary recovery. So a copyright owner possessing a timely claim for infringement is entitled to damages, no matter when the infringement occurred.

↑ Disregarding the limit in the reformulated question, Warner Chappell’s briefing in this Court focuses almost entirely on the discovery rule itself. Compare Brief for Petitioners 15–41 and Reply Brief 1–18 (disputing the discovery rule), with Brief for Petitioners 41–44 and Reply Brief 19–21 (assuming the discovery rule’s existence). That choice is especially surprising given that Warner Chappell’s own petition for certiorari raised the broader discovery-rule issue only in a footnote, which acknowledged that the issue was not raised below and is not the subject of a Circuit split. See Pet. for Cert. 14, n. But even supposing Warner Chappell’s petition had urged us to opine on the discovery rule, our reformulation of the question presented should have put an end to such arguments. “The Court decides which questions to consider through well-established procedures; allowing the able counsel who argue before us to alter these questions or to devise additional questions at the last minute would thwart this system.” Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U. S. 638, 646 (1992).

[1] Disregarding the limit in the reformulated question, Warner Chappell’s briefing in this Court focuses almost entirely on the discovery rule itself. Compare Brief for Petitioners 15–41 and Reply Brief 1–18 (disputing the discovery rule), with Brief for Petitioners 41–44 and Reply Brief 19–21 (assuming the discovery rule’s existence). That choice is especially surprising given that Warner Chappell’s own petition for certiorari raised the broader discovery-rule issue only in a footnote, which acknowledged that the issue was not raised below and is not the subject of a Circuit split. See Pet. for Cert. 14, n. But even supposing Warner Chappell’s petition had urged us to opine on the discovery rule, our reformulation of the question presented should have put an end to such arguments. “The Court decides which questions to consider through well-established procedures; allowing the able counsel who argue before us to alter these questions or to devise additional questions at the last minute would thwart this system.” Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U. S. 638, 646 (1992).

[1]