tion of subsidised forces and contingents, which has played a curious part in our Indian wars and treaties[1]^.'
The removal of Muhammad Raza from his post of power at Murshidábád was the necessary sequel to his rejection of Hastings' friendly overtures on behalf of the young Nawáb. The Governor-General knew that Francis was trying to do him all the mischief he could with natives of rank and influence in Bengal, and he looked upon the Náíb-Názim as the most powerful of Francis' agents. Muhammad Raza had shown his enmity to Hastings by rejecting a compromise which would still have left him at the head of the Nawáb's affairs. Nothing therefore remained, said Hastings, but 'to disarm both by the same act; by investing the Nabob himself with the management of his affairs, and divesting Mahomud Reza Cawn of the Neâbut[2].'
It was fortunate perhaps for Hastings that the home Government were too pre-occupied with more urgent matters to press their grievances against a Governor who declined to play into their hands. England was engaged in a doubtful war with her American colonies, and France in 1778 took up arms in their defence. The Court of Directors sorely resented Hastings' refusal to surrender office, and continued to find fault with most of his projects for the public good. But his influence with the Court of Proprietors could not be safely ignored; nor was it
