small repute that the attack on the Rohillás was 'wrong in principle, for they had not provoked us[1]'. But of two evils, Hastings chose the lesser. If the Rohillás had not directly provoked him, their intrigues with the Maráthás were a standing danger to Bengal and Oudh. It was better, he thought, to join in crushing them than to run the risk of being crushed himself. A strong political necessity drove him in self-defence into a line of action similar to that which English statesmen at home afterwards pursued towards Denmark, on two memorable occasions during the war with Napoleon Buonaparte. Hastings, moreover, felt bound in common justice to fight for an ally whose good-will had been proved by his recent conduct, and whose claims against Ráhmat Khán were founded on the treaty which an English general had personally helped to promote. In their despatch to the Directors, Hastings' Council laid particular stress upon 'the honour of the Company, pledged implicitly by General Barker's attestation for the accomplishment of this treaty, and which, added to their alliance with the Vizier, engaged us to see redress obtained for the perfidy of the Rohillás.' Were their persistent breach of faith to our ally, and their negotiations with the common enemy — the Maráthás — no provocations to the part which Hastings played in the ensuing war?
- ↑ Sir A. Lyall's Warren Hastings.
