Page:White Paper on Indian States (1950).pdf/149

This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.

139

with whatever military and naval forces may be requisite to enable it to discharge that obligation. It cannot hand over these forces to any other Government—to a foreign power such as France, or Japan; to a dominion Government such as Canada or Australia; nor even to British India".

"The necessary corollary to this is stated in the fifth proposition viz., that "The Crown can normally choose its against. But an agent cannot act when his interest may conflict with his duty. In all matters of common concern with the States—customs, railways, ports, the salt monopoly, etc.—there is always the possibility that the interest of British India may not be identical with the interest of a particular State. The Crown's duty is, or may be, to safeguard the interest of the State particularly in case of a minority administration. Should the interest of the agent be given the chance of conflicting with the duty of the principal?" This if true is putting up an effective barrier against the progress of British India towards Dominion Status, now and for ever, for it is obvious that if these 'contracts' between the Indian Princes and the British Crown and nation are of a personal character India must always continue to be divided between what is British India and Indian States, and the British nation must always maintain adequate military and naval forces to discharge its obligations to Indian States".

Dealing with tho contention that British Government could not transfer their treaty obligations to any other power or even to British India, the Committee went on to say:

"The argument ignores the settled practice of the Government of India and, by invoking so-called first principles in determining the "legal relationship", it overlooks the hard and unchallengeable fact that from the early days of the Company it has been the Government of India and the Government of India alone which has dealt with Indian Princes and Indian States. It introduces an element of "personal confidence" between them and the British nation which is not easy to understand. It suggests that the past and present Governments of India which have so far exercised the power, said to he delegated from the Crown, were and are acceptable to the Indian Princes and Indian States; but that the future