wisdom of Providence, to bring good out of evil, yet vice is vice to him who is guilty of it. " But suppose these good effects are foreseen;" that is, suppose reason in a particular case leads a man the same way as passion: why then, to be sure, he should follow his reason in this as well as in all other cases. So that, turn the matter which way ever you will, no more can be allowed to this passion than hath been already.[1]
As to that love of our enemies which is commanded; his supposes the general obligation to benevolence or good-will towards mankind ; and this being supposed, that precept is no more than to forgive injuries; that is, to keep clear of those abuses before mentioned; because, that we have the habitual temper of benevolence is taken for granted.
Resentment is not inconsistent with good-will: for we often see both together in very high degrees, not only in parents towards their children, but in cases of friendship and dependence, where there is no natural relation. These contrary passions, though they may lessen, do not necessarily destroy each other. We may therefore love our enemy, and yet have resentment against him for his injurious behaviour towards us. But when this resentment entirely destroys our natural benevolence towards him, it is excessive, and becomes malice or revenge. The command to prevent its having this effect, i.e., to forgive injuries, is the same as to love our enemies; because that love is always supposed, unless destroyed by resentment.
"But though mankind is the natural object of benevolence, yet it may it not be lessened upon vice, i.e., injury?" Allowed: but if every degree of vice or injury must destroy that benevolence, then no man is the object of our love; for no man is without faults.
"But if lower instances of injury may lessen our benevolence, why may not higher, or the highest, destroy it?"
- ↑ Serm. viii. p. 84.
